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Securing online communication, especially in email settings, is challenging. End-to-
end encryption achieves maximal security; however, introducing search capabilities is 
complicated, potentially making it impractical for email. One option is to locally 
decrypt and index emails to incorporate search, but this requires significant client-side 
storage. Encryption that is searchable at the server-side limits local storage, but 
requires other compromises as well. This thesis presents a study using conjoint 
analysis to understand user tradeoffs related to email features in order to propose a 
solution for providing usable, yet secure, email service. The results suggest that while 
it is ideal to have maximum privacy, users rely heavily on the features present in 
standard insecure email services. Furthermore, with about half of the participants 
reporting local device storage as a concern, searchable encryption could be a feasible 
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It is safe to say that society is more connected today than ever before. Whether 
through the accessibility of reliable transportation, the internet, or countless other 
communication channels, an individual has the opportunity to connect with just about 
anyone. These exchanges, however, are not always secure, leaving one vulnerable to 
various attacks. For instance, online communication channels, such as email, lacking 
proper security, give email service providers access to personal messages and search 
queries. This is not a problem until United Healthcare, perhaps, learns of your 
repeated search query related to a terminal disease and chooses not to provide you 
with a life insurance policy. In order to prevent such invasions of privacy, developers 
have created more secure means of online communication that tradeoff between 
usability and security. This is great for the future of secure communication, but not 
much is known about how users value the features and whether said tradeoffs would 









Focusing on the challenge of securing our email communications and protecting user 
privacy, this thesis sets out to answer the following motivational questions:  
 How can a better understanding of user preferences lead to usable email tools?  
 How can researchers determine the best design for secure email service 
platforms, while maximizing user privacy and considering user preferences?  
 What features should developers strongly consider when designing secure 
email services?  
 Would users adapt to a secure email service missing features they consider 
very important?  
 
We have developed a study using choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis to determine 
users’ relative level of importance for various email features.  
 
 
Chapter 2 provides a brief view of related works with Chapter 3 going into greater 
detail on the usability of currently available email options. Chapter 4 presents the 
methodology followed by the results and discussion in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively. 











2.1 Secure Email Options 
 
The public-key encryption scheme was initially designed to secure “electronic mail” 
[2]. Fast forward 40 years and the standard email service model is still completely 
insecure. Encryption is not only difficult to implement in email [3], but also in its 
primitive nature it decreases usability [4]. Steve Sheng et al. evaluated the usability of 
the PGP 9 (Pretty Good Privacy) email encryption software, finding that even after 
over 25 years of developing this email encryption tool, there are still significant 
usability issues [4]. The PGP program has led to the development of various other 
encrypted email services including the popular Mailvelope end-to-end encryption tool 
[4]. Orman discusses the portability and usefulness of encrypted email [5]. 
 
Gaw et al. preformed an interview study to understand how social factors determine 
the adoption of encryption technologies [6]. The results suggest that the use of 
encryption once came with a stigma of paranoia. De Luca et al. preformed a large 
scale survey and interview study on secure mobile messaging [7]. Their results 
recognize peer influence as the primary social factor driving people towards secure 





and adoption properties for various secure communication approaches [8]. These 
works give ground for the argument that security alone is not reason enough for users 
to embrace secure messaging services.  
 
Song et al. argued the relevance of searchable encryption for mail servers in reducing 
security risks [9]. They also discussed the provable security of this encryption 
scheme. Since this initial work, the security and efficiency of searchable encryption 
has been challenged [10] [11] and improved [12] [13]. Fuller et al. characterized 
tradeoffs between various searchable encryption solutions [14]. 
 
2.3 Typical Email Behaviors 
 
 
Researchers have devoted significant effort to understanding how users search their 
emails. Harvey and Elsweiler explored behavioral search patterns in email queries 
[15]. Whittaker et al. discovered that organizing an inbox does not improve email 
retrieval success [16]. Cecchinato et al. found that users search their personal and 
work emails differently [17]. Carmel et al. found that most email search queries in 
Yahoo! Mail are not suggested by the email service and are typically 1.49 terms long 
[18]. Likewise Ai et al. reported similar query composition in Outlook [19].  
 
Litmus Software tracked email opens for over 4 years and found that 53% of emails 





maintaining multiple devices increasing [21], the portability of older messages could 
obstruct the path to securing email services.  
 
2.3 Conjoint Analysis 
 
Conjoint analysis is a powerful tool for measuring users’ relative preferences among 
features with multiple levels [22]. Using conjoint analysis, Krasnova et al. found that 
privacy is important to users [23]. This research group used monetary value as the 
basis of comparison for the various features. Pu et al. used CBC to explore users’ 
online privacy preferences [24]. Burda et al. used CBC questions to determine users’ 
preference towards client-side encryption over server-side encryption [25]. They used 
monetary value as the basis for their analysis as well.  
 
Turner used the Sawtooth Software to conduct an adaptive conjoint analysis of user 
preference towards universities [26]. The software also has widespread use across 
marketing and medical research in determining user preferences [27] [28].  
 
2.4 Preceding Work 
 
The work that this thesis builds upon uses CBC analysis to understand user 
preferences towards email search features [29]. The results suggest that this method is 






This extended work strives to answer the questions left unanswered by the initial 
work, to validate the findings using the Sawtooth Software and a more 
comprehensive survey, and to provide a more in depth analysis of the results and 
implications.  










The email service approaches evaluated in this section are the standard email 
approach (such as Gmail, Yahoo! And Outlook), the classic end-to-end encryption 
(E2EE) email approach (such as Mailvelope), the local index email approach (similar 
to the instant messaging services WhatsApp and iMessage), and the cloud index 
email approach (which includes searchable encryption). These approaches are 
considered because they are either commercially available or have reasonably 
efficient performance. Other options, such as oblivious RAM, are not yet practical or 
scalable for use in email settings [30] [31].  
 
In this section, we will examine the following features as they relate to each secure 
email service approach: 
 Expressiveness deals with how much freedom in formulating search queries 
the email service provides. The expressiveness features we consider in this 
work are single-word search, multi-word search and partial-word search. 
Other expressiveness features commonly found in email services include 
specifying a message’s sender, recipient, subject line, date or folder. With the 
exception of subject line and folder queries in classic E2EE, these features are 
available in the approaches across the board, but not as commonly used as the 





 Performance, or simply storage requirements, takes into consideration the 
storage needed on both the client-side and the server-side to support search for 
the approach. The preceding work considered the costs associated with search 
based on bandwidth consumption and latency in search and update operations. 
For standard sized email accounts, all of the options provide efficiency such 
that the average user would not observe a lag in response time [32] [33].  
 Portability is described as the ability to access old messages on new devices, 
or how well the approach scales to more than one device.  
 Security is defined as how well the email service approach protects users 
from an adversary interested in learning private message content or search 
queries. Note that we assume a semi-honest threat model where the service 
provider is curious, but not actively deviating from the protocol. 
 
Bai et. al analyzed the literature extensively to determine that these are the categories 
worth examining in this study [29]. The attributes in these categories are important to 








3.1 Standard Approach 
 
While this option achieves maximal expressiveness, performance, and portability, it 
does not have acceptable security protocols in place. In fact, users’ messages and 
search queries are collected by their service providers by default. Table 1 displays 
how standard email fares in each feature category.   
 
Standard 
Expressiveness Single word search:  
Multi-word search: 











Table 1: Supported standard email features 
 
3.2 Classic E2EE Approach 
 
Classic E2EE is the opposite of standard privacy in the context of expressiveness. 
With this approach, messages can only be decrypted locally by the message sender or 
recipient. In order to achieve this level of privacy, classic E2EE does not support 
search on the encrypted content of any messages. For this reason, classic E2EE does 
not require a search index, trivially not consuming any local or cloud storage space 
for search. This option should not reveal any message content or search queries to the 










Single word search:  
Multi-word search: 











Table 2: Supported classic E2EE email features 
 
3.3 Cloud Index Approach 
 
Cloud index solutions allow for direct search on encrypted messages. The messages 
are decrypted locally, then the message keywords are tokenized using a secret key 
stored on the local device and then mapped to message identifiers. This search index 
is then securely stored on a server. The cloud storage does not need to be hosted by a 
separate platform in order to maintain security because the keywords are 
indistinguishable without the secret tokenization key. To retrieve messages from the 
email provider, the tokenized version of the keyword is sent to the server managing 
the search index, and the corresponding message identifiers are returned. The user’s 
device can then retrieve the messages corresponding to the message identifiers from 
the email provider. This is the way searchable encryption works as proposed by [30] 





Table 3 shows the evaluation of cloud index email service options. Since the search 
index is stored in the cloud, this option requires local storage just to retrieve the 
tokenization of each unique word in the messages (O(W log D) where W is the total 
number of unique keywords and D is the total number of messages). The server, 
however, requires O(N) space where N represents the total number of keyword to 
message pairs. Islam et al. found that the server could learn information about 
particular search queries using access pattern analysis [31]. Note that cloud index 
options do not allow for partial word searches. The reason being that partial keywords 




Single word search:  
Multi-word search: 








O(W log D) 
Portability Potentially 
Security Some 








3.4 Local Index Approach 
 
As with cloud index solutions, local index solutions allow for search on encrypted 
messages. In this approach, messages are also decrypted locally but the search index 
is stored in plaintext locally as well. To retrieve messages from the server, this service 
provides the message identifiers from the locally stored search index table directly. 
This option does not require any cloud storage for the search table, but it requires 
local device storage to hold all of the keyword to message mappings. Since all queries 
are handled locally, no information about the index or queries is given to the email 
service provider. This ensures added security from the cloud index option in that the 
search index is taken offline. However, local index solutions cannot provide the same 
security guarantees as classic E2EE because the email provider can obtain message 




Single word search:  
Multi-word search: 

























We recruited 253 participants to take our survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). We chose to recruit on MTurk to obtain a large sample of high-quality 
workers in one convenient space [34]. The primary benefit of using MTurk is in the 
ability to request workers that meet specific research criteria. To improve the quality 
of the data, we required our participants to be at least 18 years old, to be located in the 
United States, to have at least 50 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) approved and to 
have a HIT Approval Rate greater than 95%. The age restriction was to ensure the 
participants could consent for themselves. We wanted participants living in the 
United States so that the compensation and currency exchange would be equal. The 
participants were also limited to taking the survey once. We set the HIT requirements 
to ensure the participants were in good standing amongst other MTurk recruiters and 
that they were capable of completing previous surveys [35]. 
 
We paid the participants $2.50 to complete the survey, requiring less than 20 minutes 
of their time. The participants were given a consent form and asked to confirm their 





The study’s recruitment procedure was approved by the University of Maryland’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). 
 
4.2 Features and Options 
 
We define a feature as a property or an attribute of an email service approach (for 
example, privacy). We define an option as a setting or a level of a feature (for 
example, standard, extra or maximum). The features and options were included in the 
survey based on frequency of use and variance between secure email service options.  
Single word search, partial word search and multi-word search are the expressiveness 
features included in the survey. Our previous work did not include single word search 
expressiveness because it focused primarily on cloud index and local index as viable 
secure email approaches. To consider classic E2EE, we include single word search as 
a feature in this study. The search expressiveness difference between cloud and local 
index approaches is that cloud index does not support partial-word search. Also worth 
mentioning, additional auxiliary expressions are rarely used in practice [19], so to 
keep the number of survey questions within reasonable range, we do not include them 
in the survey. 
 
Classic E2EE and cloud index approaches fit the 5MB device storage option and the 
local index approach falls into the 500MB device storage option. The actual storage 
requirements depend on the number of keywords a user has in an email account, so 





To make the storage requirements relatable, we gave the participants a storage to 
photo and device application conversion. 
 
Classic E2EE, local index and cloud index approaches have optional portability 
support. This feature requires a slightly different key management protocol, but it is 
possible to read messages from before a new device was activated. The cloud and 
local index approaches would also support search on the older messages. 
  
The privacy feature in the survey specifies what the email service provider can learn 
about the user’s messages and search queries. Standard privacy reflects the standard 
email approach where the email service provider has access to the contents of all 
messages and search queries. The extra privacy option echoes the cloud index 
approach with the email service provider potentially having access to emails and 
email search queries of high interest. For the definition provided in the survey, both 
classic E2EE and local index approaches imitate the maximum privacy setting where 
the email service provider cannot learn the content of any email or search query.   
 
A common attempt to make conjoint utilities more understandable is to express them 
in dollar equivalents [23] [25]. This is a way of removing the arbitrariness in their 
scaling [36]. To do this, we include price as a feature. Rather than using a random 
price for the email service options, we surveyed the costs of email services on 















4.3 Conjoint Analysis 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, CBC analysis is a powerful tool for determining user’s 
relative preferences towards multiple features.   
 
For our study, we include seven attributes varying between two and three levels. In 
CBC studies, questions can be presented as either full profiles or partial profiles. Full 
profile questions display an option from every feature in the study in every profile, 
while partial profile questions display options for only a subset of the features. 
Traditional fractional-factorial designs, and specifically the complete enumeration 
approach, present nearly orthogonal profiles to each participant [37]. We use full 
profiles and complete enumeration which gives us the option of analyzing each 
participant’s relative preferences individually. With Sawtooth’s use of complete 
enumeration, the full ranking of the 7 features is achieved using just 15 questions 
with 2 full orthogonal profiles each [38]. This technique provides the equivalent of 
each participant ranking 192 unique profiles. Prior work has found that survey 
participants can accurately classify up to 17 profiles before becoming inattentive [39], 
thus our set of 16 questions fares well.  
 
Questions can either be set for each survey participant or randomized. We use a 
randomized design to give nearly every participant a unique survey.  One of the 
benefits of the randomized design is that data can be aggregated question-by-





utilities based on only that question [37].  This allows for high-quality and efficient 
estimation of aggregate utilities. There will be more information about data analysis 
in Section 4.5. 
 
The wording of both the questions and the response options in this study is very 
important. For example, our previous study asked the participants to recommend one 
of the email service profiles for a friend. This is a standard technique for surveying 
participants about sensitive topics [40], but it is questionable whether email service 
options fits in that category. Recommending a service for a friend could disassociate 
the participant with the profiles, producing nonchalant responses. For this reason, this 
study requires the participants to choose the email service profile that they would 
most likely use. Next, the “None” option in a conjoint analysis survey is advised [37], 
though the hope is that participants do not abused this option.  We worded none 
option as “I am equally inclined to choose either of these options” to ensure the 
participant realizes that they would have to live with one of the two options, or no 
email service at all.  
 
 
Figure 1 shows the prompt presented before the CBC portion of the survey and Figure 
2 gives an example of a CBC question from the survey. Note that Table 5 was 







Figure 1: CBC question directions 
 
Figure 2: Example of a potential CBC question 
 
 
While it has been studied that MTurk participants perform well on online attention 
check questions [41], we included one attention check question during the conjoint 
analysis portion of the questionnaire. Shown in Figure 3, the fixed CBC question has 







Figure 3: Attention check CBC question 
 
4.4 Clarifying Questions 
 
 
The survey begins and ends with clarification questions. Figure 4 shows the first 
question of the survey where participants are given Table 5, the features table, and 
asked to answer questions based on the feature descriptions in the table. This question 
is designed to help the participants understand the feature descriptions as presented in 
the study so they are not making their own assumptions about what the features 
entail. If the participants answer any of the questions incorrectly, they can review the 






Figure 4: Feature description clarification question 
 
After the CBC questions, participants are asked to report how often they use various 
features and to specify the features’ importance.  This question is shown in Figure 5. 
The responses to this question will allow us to see the correlation between the self-






Figure 5:  Feature use and importance clarification question 
 
An additional question, shown in Figure 6, was only presented to 100 random 
participants. The question asks if the participants would use a service missing various 
features, but including maximum privacy. This aims to answer whether users would 
adapt to any secure email service they are given, for the sake of privacy. Based on the 
responses to these clarification questions, participants are given 1 open-ended 






Figure 6: Missing feature clarification question 
 
Next, participants report how well they understand a set of six web topics based off of 
the well-validated Hargittai et al. scale [42] by answering the question shown in 
Figure 7. Lastly, we collect demographic information from each participant and this, 
along with the web skills question, is used to determine if there are any direct 
correlations between technical or socioeconomic backgrounds and the participants’ 
email feature preferences.  
 
 





The responses to the questions in this section are used to understand the “why” 
behind participants’ relative feature preferences.  
 
4.5 Data Analysis 
 
There are a number of ways to analyze CBC data. We could use the counting model, 
simply considering the number of times an option level was chosen versus the 
number of times the option level was presented. There is also the logit method which 
uses the participant’s part-worths, or conjoint utilities, to determine the probabilities 
of the participant choosing alternative options. Then there is the Hierarchical Bayes 
(HB) model which leverages information from all participants to estimate the results 
for each individual participant [43]. This model is thorough in that it collects each 
participant’s part-worths in a multivariate normal distribution using Gibbs Sampling 
[43]. This distribution is characterized by a vector of means and a matrix of 
covariances [43]. For our analysis, we will use both the count and HB models.  
 
Since we want to characterize the relative importance of each feature, we will 
consider the difference each feature makes in the total utility of an email service. 
Moreover, we also want to characterize the relative importance of each feature option, 
so we will consider the difference each feature option makes in the total utility of 
each profile. We will then calculate the percentages from the relative ranges to obtain 





We will use various statistical analysis techniques to interpret the data as well. Our 
predictive model used to obtain the correlation between the features is regression. To 
identify correlations between chosen options and self-reported data we use 
segmentation by way of convergent cluster and ensemble Analysis. This is a way of 
categorizing participants into groups in order to determine if the survey respondents 




As with any study, there are limitations to our methodology. First, the population of 
people who use email is not completely reflected by the distribution of survey 
participants. In fact, MTurk workers are typically younger, predominantly white, 
more educated and more concerned about online privacy than the general population 
[45]. Furthermore, the primary concern lies in the question of whether self-reported 
data is enough to draw any real conclusions. Vetschera and Kainz found that even 
with anonymous surveys, participants sometimes inflate the characteristics they feel 
seem “right” [46]. This is somewhat stabilized in our study with the use of CBC 
analysis. Participants are not explicitly choosing between one feature and another, but 
rather they are choosing between profiles. Therefore, a participant would have to go 
to greater lengths to disguise their true preferences. This study may not be the basis of 
all future secure email service decisions, but it will give the developers insight to user 
















Of the 253 participants recruited on MTurk, we received 200 uniquely qualified 
surveys. Identifying careless and inattentive survey data is critical to establishing 
accurate results [47]. Table 6 shows a breakdown of the disqualified questionnaire 
respondents. To select the cutoffs for disqualification criteria we preformed time 
experiments on 12 volunteers with diverse backgrounds. We first had six volunteers 
attentively take the survey and they performed this task in an average of 15 minutes, 
ranging between 12 minutes and 17 minutes. Next, we had six volunteers attempt to 
take the survey as quickly and as accurately as possible. These participants completed 
the survey in times ranging between eight minutes and 14 minutes. They completed 
the conjoint analysis section in times ranging between 2 minutes and 5 minutes. Since 
MTurkers are considered more tech-savvy and spend more time completing online 
surveys than our volunteer pool, we took the minimum times demonstrated by this 





 Hence, participants who completed the survey in less than six minutes, completed the 
conjoint analysis portion of the survey in less than 100 seconds, answered any of the 
conjoint analysis questions in under three seconds, answered the attention check 
question inaccurately or took the survey multiple times were disqualified. The table 
also shows the overlap of participants who were disqualified in multiple categories. 
50% of disqualified participants were ineligible in more than one category, further 










Survey completed in less than 6 
minutes 
30, 31, 35, 48, 50, 
61, 106, 121, 134, 
164, 166, 178, 188, 
189, 194, 198, 200, 
212, 223, 227, 236, 
252, 257, 275, 277, 
284, 293, 301, 304 
29 21 = 72.4% 
Conjoint analysis section completed in 
less than 100 seconds 
35, 106, 164, 166, 
198, 203, 227, 252, 
277, 282, 293 
11 11 = 100% 
Conjoint analysis profile selected in 3 
seconds or less 
26, 30, 31, 35, 47, 
55, 61, 106, 112, 
113, 121, 128, 150, 
164, 166, 188, 198, 
200, 202, 203, 209, 
218, 227, 236, 252, 
254, 257, 263, 268, 
271, 273, 275, 282, 
283, 284, 293, 301 
37 28 = 75.8% 
Wrong attention check choice selected 48, 92, 135, 136, 
166, 175, 183, 184, 
188, 200, 203, 236, 
252, 254, 268, 282 
16 10 = 62.5% 
Completed the survey multiple times 55 = 164 
64 = 112 and 113 
200 = 202 and 203 
268 = 271 and 275 
11 10 = 90.9% 
Table 6: Breakdown of the disqualified questionnaire responses showing the overlap in disqualified 






Table 7 shows the demographics of the eligible participants. 56% of the participants 
were male, the mean age reported was 37 years old, 81% of the participants were 
white, 37% have completed at least their Bachelor’s degree, 46% have an income 
above 50,000 dollars, 21% work or were educated in a technical field and of the 21% 







































Race American Indian or Alaska Native 
Asian 
Black or African American 
Hispanic or Latino 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
White 
Other 

















Education Some high school 


























Technical background Yes 
No 















Income Less than $25,000 
$25,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $74,999 
$75,000 to $99,999 
$100,000 to $149,999 
$150,000 or more 















Table 7: Participant demographics (the percentages may not add up to 100% because participants had 







5.1.2 Web Skills 
 
Table 8 displays the self-reported web skills of the 200 participants. 44% report 
having full understanding of advanced search (mean=4.02), 55% for PDF 
(mean=4.39), 39% for spyware (mean=4.00), 51% for Wiki (mean=4.17), 39% for 
cache (mean=3.96) and 43% for phishing (mean=3.96). On the 5-point scale, these 
participants have a score of 4.1. 
 
































































































5.2 Conjoint Analysis 
 
Figure 8 presents a pie chart of the HB analysis data for the 200 participants. The 
relative importance ranks price as most important with 20.2%, followed by privacy 
with 18.7%, message portability with 13.8%, storage with 13.5%, multi-word search 
with 12.5%, single-word search with 11.6% and lastly partial-word search with 9.7%.  
  
 
Figure 8: Pie chart for the relative importance of each email feature 
 
 
Table 9 presents the part-worth utilities and relative importance for the features and 



































































































































Table 9: Part-worth utilities, upper and lower confidence intervals, relative importance, standard 
















































Table 10 displays the part-worth utility change for the feature options and the dollar 
equivalents. To find the dollar equivalents we divided the utility change of the price 




Features Option Change Utility Change Dollar Equivalent 
Price $1.99 per month $0.00 (free) 0.506  
Single-word search No  Yes 0.168 $0.66 
Multi-word search No  Yes 0.148 $0.58 
Partial-word search No  Yes .067 $0.26 
Privacy 
StandardMaximum  
Extra  Maximum 







Storage 500 MB  5MB 0.060 $0.24 
Portability No  Yes 0.110 $0.43 
Table 10: Part-worth utility change for the features and options and the dollar equivalent of the 
changes 
 
5.3 Email Feature Use and Importance 
5.3.1 Feature Use 
 
Tables 11, 12 and 13 present the data for how often the participants use single-word 
search, multi-word search and partial-word search respectively. On at least a monthly 
basis, 79% of the participants use single-word search, 61% use multi-word search and 






Frequency of use: single-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Daily 22 11 
2 Weekly 85 43 
3 Monthly 49 25 
4 A few times a year 28 13 
5 Once a year or less 16 8 
 
 




Frequency of use: multi-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Daily 16 8 
2 Weekly 59 30 
3 Monthly 45 23 
4 A few times a year 37 18 
5 Once a year or less 43 21 
 
 







Frequency of use: partial-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Daily 14 7 
2 Weekly 48 24 
3 Monthly 43 22 
4 A few times a year 46 23 
5 Once a year or less 49 24 
 
 
Table 13: Frequency of use for the partial-word search feature 
 
 
Table 14 shows how often the participants access emails on more than one device, 
with 90% of participants performing this task at least monthly.  
 
Frequency of use: access emails on multiple devices 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Daily 99 50 
2 Weekly 55 28 
3 Monthly 24 12 
4 A few times a year 11 5 
5 Once a year or less 11 5 
 
 






Table 15 shows how often the participants delete items on their device to save space, 
with 53% of the participants performing this task at least monthly. Furthermore, 45% 
of survey participants report local device storage as a problem for their devices.  
 
 
Frequency of use: delete items on device to save space 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Daily 20 10 
2 Weekly 33 17 
3 Monthly 52 26 
4 A few times a year 43 21 
5 Once a year or less 52 26 
 
 
Table 15: Frequency of deleting items on a device to save space 
 
 
Table 16 illustrates how often the participants search for emails older than 3 months. 







Frequency of use: search for emails older than 3 months 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Daily 3 3 
2 Weekly 22 10 
3 Monthly 56 28 
4 A few times a year 97 49 
5 Once a year or less 22 10 
 
 
Table 16: Frequency of searching for emails older than 3 months 
 
5.3.2 Feature Importance 
 
Tables 17, 18 and 19 present the distribution for how important participants rate 
single-word search, multi-word search and partial-word search respectively. 63% of 
the participants find single-word search important, 45% find multi-word search 







Feature importance: single-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Not at all important 18 8 
2 Slightly important 45 23 
3 Neither important nor unimportant 12 6 
4 Fairly important 75 38 
5 Very important 50 25 
 




Feature importance: multi-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Not at all important 33 16 
2 Slightly important 50 25 
3 Neither important nor unimportant 29 14 
4 Fairly important 57 29 
5 Very important 31 16 
 







Feature importance: partial-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Not at all important 47 23 
2 Slightly important 48 24 
3 Neither important nor unimportant 30 15 
4 Fairly important 54 27 
5 Very important 21 11 
 
Table 19: Importance of partial-word search 
 
Table 20 illustrates the distribution for how important participants rank having access 







Feature importance: access to emails on multiple devices 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Not at all important 8 4 
2 Slightly important 22 11 
3 Neither important nor unimportant 23 12 
4 Fairly important 52 26 
5 Very important 95 48 
 
Table 20: Importance of access to emails on multiple devices 
 
 
5.3.3 Missing Features 
 
Select participants were asked how likely they would be to use an email service that 
has maximum privacy, but is missing either single-word search, multi-word search, 
partial-word search or message portability. Tables 21, 22, 23 and 24 present the data 
for the 73 eligible participants. 51% of the participants are unlikely to use an email 
service without single-word search, 27% for an email service missing multi-word 
search, 21% for an email service lacking partial-word search and 53% for an email 






Missing features w/ maximum privacy: single-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Very likely (would use the service) 11 15 
2 Likely 11 15 
3 Indifferent 14 19 
4 Unlikely 28 39 
5 Very unlikely (would not use the service) 9 12 
 
Table 21: Likelihood of using an email service with maximum privacy, but without single-word search 
 
 
Missing features w/ maximum privacy: multi-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Very likely (would use the service) 16 22 
2 Likely 16 22 
3 Indifferent 21 29 
4 Unlikely 16 22 
5 Very unlikely (would not use the service) 4 5 
 






Missing features w/ maximum privacy: partial-word search 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Very likely (would use the service) 16 22 
2 Likely 17 23 
3 Indifferent 25 34 
4 Unlikely 11 15 
5 Very unlikely (would not use the service) 4 6 
 
Table 23: Likelihood of using an email service with maximum privacy, but without partial-word search 
 
Missing features w/ maximum privacy: access to email on multiple devices 
Value Label Count Percent 
1 Very likely (would use the service) 7 10 
2 Likely 16 22 
3 Indifferent 11 15 
4 Unlikely 22 30 
5 Very unlikely (would not use the service) 17 23 
 













In this chapter we review the results found in Chapter 5 and make connections 
between various entities. Unless otherwise noted, the information presented in this 
chapter has been determined statistically significant with p < 0.01 using Sawtooth’s 
count analysis tool.  
 
We use multiple statistical analysis techniques to interpret the data. The predictive 
model used to get the correlations between the features is regression. This tool takes 
as input all of the user responses to the CBC questions and normalizes them to give 
the relative importance for each feature. To identify correlations between chosen 
options and self-reported data we use segmentation by way of Convergent Cluster and 
Ensemble Analysis. This method takes as input the utilities, importance, 
demographics, web skills, feature use or feature importance. It then categorizes 
respondents into sets based on these inputs in order to determine if the participants 
“cluster” into identifiable and statistically important groups [44]. These tools are built 











The participants who took this survey fit the MTurk pattern of being more tech-savvy. 
Though only 21% report having technical backgrounds, they had an average score of 
4.1 on the web skills scale which is 14% higher than the score of 3.4 reported by 
Hargittai et al. [42]. This could also be attributed to the fact that this study was 
performed 8 years ago. It is interesting to note that 91% of the participants at least 
started college.  
 
6.2 Conjoint Analysis 
 
Overall, the CBC HB results make sense and align with the results of the previous 
study.  
 
As with that study, price and privacy have the highest relative importance. The count 
ratio is the ratio between the number of times an option is shown and the number of 
times the option is selected. The count ratio of the $0.00 (free) option is 0.650 and for 
the $1.99 per month option it is 0.293. This means that when the paid option was 
presented, participants only selected the profile with this option 29% of the time. This 
feature has the largest gap between options with a 35.7% difference between the free 
and paid options. We can infer that some users are not willing to pay for an email 
service. This is likely attributed to the fact that there are a plethora of free email 





The count ratio for standard privacy is 0.351, for extra privacy it is 0.477 and for 
maximum privacy it is 0.588. Moreover, the utility change for standard privacy to 
maximum privacy is 0.184 ($0.72), for extra privacy to maximum privacy it is 0.095 
($0.37) and for standard privacy to extra privacy it is 0.089 ($0.35). Relative to the 
standard to maximum privacy utility change of 0.184, the extra to maximum privacy 
difference is 48% and the standard to extra privacy difference is 52%. This 4% 
difference implies that jumping from standard to extra privacy is only slightly less 
valued than the jump from extra privacy to maximum privacy ($0.02). In our previous 
study, standard to extra privacy had a greater utility change than extra to maximum 
privacy, though neither of the utility changes came close to the utility change for 
standard to maximum privacy. This implies that the participants in this study value 
maximum privacy more than the participants in our last study though altogether, these 
results verify the results found in our previous study that extra privacy may be good 
enough for most users.  
 
Not only is the relative importance for price and privacy highest, but the standard 
deviation for these features is also the highest. This means that users have a higher 
variance in their views of importance for these features then, say, partial-word search 
which has the lowest variance. It seems that users can come to a consensus that 
certain features are not important, but the features that are most important vary. 
 
Portability and storage have almost equal relative importance, 13.8% and 13.5% 





equal, with 5MB having only a 0.028 higher ratio, and both are less than half 
(statistically insignificant). A possible explanation for the ratios being so close is that 
both 5MB of storage and 500MB of storage are acceptable to some of the 
participants. This is verified by the distribution of the relative importance of storage 
for each participant. The range for the relative importance of storage is from 0.01 to 
41.14 with the median being 11.84. That means that half of the participants had 
storage relative importance less than 11.84 and half had it more than 11.84. Since the 
results are aggregated, the total relative importance reflects an average. Therefore, we 
see that some participants heavily considered storage when choosing between profiles 
and others did not consider it as heavily. This explains why the standard deviation 
and relative importance is high, but the part-worth is low. Moreover, a theory for why 
both options have ratios less than one half is that storage is the factor most causally 
related to participants choosing the “None” option. We will discuss the “None” 
statistics later in this section. 
  
Single-word search and multi-word search have close relative importance, differing 
by less than 1%. The count ratio for these search features is about one-half. This 
could be because there were likely a number of times a profile had one of the search 
features, but not the other. Meaning, it is easier to live without single-word search if 
an email service provides multi-word search.  
 
Besides price, privacy and partial-word search, the other features had comparatively 





features are all important to users, and therefore important to include in a secure 
email service. The low relative importance of partial-word search may mean that 
single-word search and multi-word search are sufficient for searching emails. 
 
The “None” option was indeed use sparingly in this study. 75 of the 200 qualified 
participants used this option at least once. Of the 75 participants who used this option, 
the mean number of times it was used in a participant’s CBC data set is 2.3 or 14.4% 
of the time (statistically insignificant). Altogether, the “None” option constitutes for 
173, or 5.4%, of the total 3200 CBC responses which means that participants 
typically chose between the two profiles they were given.  
 
6.3 Clarification Questions 
 
The frequency of use results align with previous research in that the survey 
participants regularly use single-word search, sometimes use multi-word search and 
rarely use partial-word search. With the average search term being 1.49 terms [18], 
this implies users most often use single-word search. Moreover, these results tie in 
with the CBC results in that partial-word search is not used very often and it has the 
lowest relative importance.  
 
Participants who reported using single-word search daily had higher relative 
importance for all of the search features (single-word search = 13.21 which is 12.6% 





which is 8.8% higher). Participants who reported using multi-word search daily had 
an even higher relative importance for all of the search features (single-word search = 
15.28 which is 24.4% higher, multi-word search = 15.24 which is 18.3% higher, 
partial-word search = 10.77 which is 9.7% higher). We see a dip in the relative 
importance of multi-word search for participants who reported using partial-word 
search daily but a higher relative importance for partial-word search (single-word 
search = 11.66 which is 0.9% higher, multi-word search = 8.28 which is 33.5% lower, 
partial-word search = 11.72 which is 20.6% higher). This reassures us that the 
participants were choosing profiles based on how they use their email. 
 
Portability has a higher relative importance than the search features which make sense 
because users report using this feature more often. Participants who reported 
accessing messages on multiple devices daily had higher relative importance for the 
syncing old email to a new device feature (=14.67 which is 6.1% higher). Moreover, 
participants who said this feature is important also had higher relative importance for 
the portability feature (=14.42 which is 4.3% higher). Participants who mentioned 
that they would be unlikely to use an email service without message portability 
showed a slight increase in this feature’s relative importance as well (=14.48 which is 
4.7% higher). 
 
The relative importance of storage aligns with the fact that 45% of the survey 





approach uses the most device storage. These results suggest that users may shy away 
from local index email options to preserve space on their devices.  
 
In line with the idea that while privacy is very important, users are not willing to give 
up valued features, are the results of the question asking if the participants would use 
an email service with maximum privacy but lacking various other features. The 
majority of participants would not use an email service that does not provide single-
word search or is not portable. This implies that end-to-end encryption is not a viable 
secure email service solution for most users.  
 
On the other hand, a small percentage of the participants would be willing to give up 
the usability features in order to obtain maximum privacy. For these participants, the 
relative importance of privacy was higher than the total relative importance of 
















Price 20.23 22.61 23.37 24.06 17.79 
Single-word search 11.55 5.61 9.88 8.83 5.97 
Multi-word search 12.45 15.44 10.91 11.84 12.92 
Partial-word search 9.72 7.2 11.11 9.28 7.34 
Privacy 18.7 24.28 21.02 22.93 27.47 
Storage on your 
device 
13.52 11.07 12.16 9.57 12.77 
Syncing old email to 
a new device 
13.83 13.8 11.56 13.5 15.73 
Table 25: Comparison of participants who would accept maximum privacy over usability features 
(these values are not statistically significant) 
 
An added benefit of asking clarification questions is that the participants are able to 
explain why they feel various features are important. Participants who reported 
single-word search as very important typically explained that with the number of 
emails in their accounts, using a search query is the only way to efficiently find a 
particular email. One participant said, “I recently bought a new computer but needed 
to find the email with my resume in it so I typed "Resume" and those emails were 
shown. If it wasn't for single-word search then I would have had to go through 
thousands of emails to find it.” Others admitted that they do not delete or organize 
their emails, so they need search capabilities to sort through the clutter.  
 
Participants who ranked multi-word search as very important said that using a single-
word search still returns too many irrelevant emails. Here a participant mentioned, “I 
don't want a vague search result. I have to include multiple words so that I can get the 






Participants who reported partial-word search as very important explained that it 
takes less effort to develop a partial-word search query. Also, they noted that they 
cannot always remember a full keyword or correct spelling of a keyword, so partial-
word search gives them a smaller subset of emails to sort through. Overall, 
participants noted that having search functionality saves them time and energy when 
trying to find an email. 
 
Participants who see the importance of synching across multiple devices expressed 
that they are expected, both professionally and socially, to be responsive to their 
emails at all times, even when they cannot get to their desktop computer. A 
participant reported, “It would be a nightmare to keep up without everything syncing 
together.” 
 
6.4 Data Trends 
 
An interesting trend, shown in Table 26, is between income and relative price 
importance. The relative importance of price tends to increase with income. This 
could indicate that users with higher income value money more and are less willing to 

















Price 20.23 18 18.8 20.35 24.06 22.91 
Single-word 
search 
11.55 13.72 10.86 14.1 8.24 9.4 
Multi-word 
search 
12.45 11.35 12.91 10.79 14.63 13.55 
Partial-word 
search 
9.72 9.59 10.8 10.2 8.19 7.8 
Privacy 18.7 19.04 20.05 17.61 17.87 18.73 
Storage on 
your device 
13.52 13.09 13.38 15.24 13.8 10.95 
Syncing old 
email to a 
new device 
13.83 15.21 13.2 11.7 13.21 16.66 
Table 26: Trend between education and relative importance; statistically significant with p < 0.01 for 
price only 
 
Table 27 shows the trend between having a score of 5.0 on the web skills scale and 
the relative importance of privacy. Those who reported having a full understanding of 
the various topics have a 15.1% higher relative importance for privacy than the 
average and a 20.4% higher relative importance for privacy than those who reported 




Attribute Total Full understanding of phishing & full 
understanding of spyware 
Other 
Price 20.23 17.22 21.72 
Single-word search 11.55 12.67 11 
Multi-word search 12.45 11.62 12.86 
Partial-word search 9.72 8.99 10.08 
Privacy 18.7 21.53 17.88 
Storage on your device 13.52 12.86 13.84 
Syncing old email to a new 
device 
13.83 14.98 13.27 
Table 27: Trend between having a full understanding of web skill security topics (phishing and 






Tables 28 and 29 show the effect of price on privacy and email portability. These are 
the only statistically significant correlations observed in the data.  
 
Table 28 presents that, other factors included, users selected a profile with no cost, 
but with standard privacy 9.9% more frequently than they selected the paid option 
with maximum privacy. This is much less than the other frequencies, which confirms 




Price x Privacy 
Price option Privacy option Count ratio 
$0.00 (free) Standard 0.514 
$0.00 (free) Extra 0.675 
$0.00 (free) Maximum 0.764 
$1.99 (per month) Standard 0.183 
$1.99 (per month) Extra 0.279 
$1.99 (per month) Maximum 0.415  
Interaction Chi-Square 18.411 
Table 28: Effect of price on the privacy feature 
 
 
Table 29 presents that, other factors included, users selected a profile with no cost, 








Price x Syncing old email to a new device 
Price option Sync option Count ratio 
$0.00 (free) Yes 0.697 
$0.00 (free) No 0.603 
$1.99 (per month) Yes 0.354 
$1.99 (per month) No 0.233  
Interaction Chi-Square 10.831 
Table 29: Effect of price on the device syncing feature 
 
Once again, these trends show that users are not willing to pay for their email service. 
 
6.5 Future Work 
 
This study provides a substantial amount of information about user requirements for 
email services. The logical next step would be to develop a secure email tool that 
meets the needs of the users. However, if we were to deploy the survey again, it 
would be interesting to see the weight of the features in the absence of price. It is 
difficult to disentangle the weight of price from the actual value of other features. 
While price is a feature that can alter a user’s preference towards a product, this 
feature may need to be studied separately.  
 
Another way to add value to this work would be to broaden the participant 
demographic. MTurk arguably provides the most reliable data for online surveys; 
however, it is likely that requiring participants to take the survey in a controlled 
environment would both cut back on inattentive responses and shed light on the 





Lastly, with a bit of fine tuning this survey can be used by secure email service 
providers to suggest the option that would best fit each user. This would benefit the 
service providers because users would be more likely to use a service that meets their 












In this chapter, we revisit the research questions presented in the introduction.  
 
 How can a better understanding of user preferences lead to usable email tools? 
Knowing what the user needs or wants in an email service allows the designer to 
develop tools that meet these needs. If the user’s needs are met and the service 
only adds benefit, users would have less reason not to adopt the tool. We cannot 
account for user’s who wish not to migrate to a new or updated email tool for no 
reason other than that it is new. 
 How can researchers determine the best design for secure email service 
platforms, while maximizing user privacy and considering user preferences?  
Researchers could use a variation of this study to determine the needs of the 
client, individual or organization. The survey gives a clear view of the needs of 
the client and the HB analysis provides a concise output of the email service 
option best aligned with the client’s preferences. 
 What features should developers strongly consider when designing secure 
email services? 
Developers have already made substantial progress in including the important 
expressiveness features in their tools. With the exception of classic E2EE, the 





which are most important to users. Moreover, both local index options and cloud 
index options cover the great need for email portability. Based on the results, 
local index options could work for most users. Although device storage options 
are continually increasing, a large number of users still see device storage as a 
major concern. Until local index options consume lower local storage, searchable 
encryption may see broader adoption. For this reason, local index developers 
should work on reducing the size of the search index.  
 Would users adapt to a secure email service missing features they consider 
very important?  
Over 60% of users who reported having a full understanding of web security 
topics reported that they are unlikely to use an email service option that achieves 
maximum privacy, but lacks a feature of personal importance (71.2% for single 
word search, 68.8% for multi-word search, 68.2% for partial word search and 
63.95% for portability averaged across the 2 web security questions). These 
results show how important it is to give users the features they desire in an email 
service option, as most users would not choose to adapt to a secure email service 
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